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BANKRUPTCY LIEN
INVALIDATION: ROLE OF
RECORDATION

DAVID

G.

EPSTEIN*

Congress is currently considering new bankruptcy legislation. To date, its focus has been on two bills, one prepared by
the National Commission on Bankruptcy Laws, 1 the other by
the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges. 2 Both bills call
for substantial changes in present bankruptcy practices. Affirmative action on some combination of the two now seems
likely. It appears that Congress soon will, for the first time in
77 years, comprehensively revise bankruptcy law. Accordingly,
this is an appropriate time to examine closely basic bankruptcy
concepts and policies. This article will deal with one very specific topic: the effect of recordation on lien invalidation under
present bankruptcy law and under the proposed acts.
I.

PRESENT LA w

"[B]ankruptcy is one of those words, like 'war', that you
have heard all your life and think that you understand until
you actually become involved with the process the word is intended to identify." 3 Bankruptcy is a federal creditors' remedy
and debtors' relief provision. There are presently several forms
of bankruptcy proceedings. 4 The overwhelming majority of
bankruptcy proceedings are "straight bankruptcy" and most
laymen and all too many lawyers use the terms "bankruptcy"
* Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law; J.D., 1966, University of
Texas; LL.M., 1969, Harvard. Member of the State Bar of Texas and the State Bar of
Arizona.
1. H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. The companion bill in the Senate in S. 236. J'his
will be referred to hereafter as the Commission's Bill in the text and (Commission) in
the footnotes.
2. H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. The companion bill in the Senate is S.235. This
will be referred to hereafter as the Judges' Bill in the text and as (Judges) in footnotes.
3. J.WEIDMAN, FOURTH STREET EAST 219 (1970).
4. See generally D. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW IN A NUTSHELL (1973).
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and "straight bankruptcy" interchangeably. Straight bankruptcy is in the nature of a liquidation proceeding and involves
the collection and distribution to creditors of all the bankrupt's
nonexempt property by the bankruptcy trustee in the manner
provided in the Bankruptcy Act. As part of the proceedings, the
bankrupt is discharged from all of his "provable" debts absent
the application of one of the exclusions from discharge set out
in section 145 of the Act or exceptions from discharge set out
in section 17.
Straight bankruptcy proceedings may be instituted voluntarily by the debtor or involuntarily by creditor action. Voluntary bankruptcies outnumber involuntary bankruptcies by
more than one hundred to one. Voluntary straight bankruptcy
is available to most individuals and businesses. 6 The solvency
of the petitioner is immaterial, as is the amount of his liabilities, so long as he has debts.
While any person eligible under section 4a may, with few
requirements, file a voluntary petition and be automatically
adjudicated bankrupt, the situation in an involuntary proceeding is somewhat more complicated. 7 Adjudication upon an involuntary petition is dependent upon satisfaction of the following conditions:
(1)

The debtor owes debts of $1,000 or more;

(2) The debtor is not within one of the three classes of
persons eligible for voluntary bankruptcy protected by section
4b from an involuntary petition;
(3) The petition is filed or joined by a sufficient number
of qualified creditors; 8
(4) The bankrupt has committed one of the six acts of
bankruptcy enumerated in section 3a;
(5) The petition must be filed within four months of the
commission of the act of bankruptcy;
5. The Bankruptcy Act is found in Title 11 of the United States Code. Section
numbers in Title 11 do not correspond to the more commonly used section numbers of
the Act. All references in this article are to Bankruptcy Act section numbers.
6. See Bankruptcy Act § 4.
7. Id. § 4b.
8. See Bankruptcy Act§ 59.
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(6) The debtor is properly served with the petition and
defaults or is adjudicated bankrupt after a trial.
After adjudication, the procedure in an involuntary
straight bankruptcy proceeding is the same as in voluntary
proceedings. The bankruptcy judge calls a first meeting of
creditors and sends notice to all creditors scheduled by the
bankrupt. An important feature of the first meeting of creditors
is the selection of the trustee. The trustee is the representative
of the creditors, and the Bankruptcy Act provides for selection
of a trustee by creditors. While the bankruptcy judge supervises the task of collection and distribution of the bankrupt's
estate, the actual job of collection and distribution is the trustee's.
A valid lien is particularly important to a creditor when
the debtor is bankrupt. 9 All creditors do not participate equally
in the distribution. A creditor with a valid lien is paid first to
the extent of the value of the property subject to the lien. Then,
creditors entitled to priority under section 64 of the Bankruptcy
Act are paid. Then, a pro rate distribution is made to the
general creditors.
The following hypothetical illustrates the practical significance of a valid lien in straight bankruptcy. B files a voluntary
bankruptcy petition. At the time of the petition, Bowes $3,000
to S who has a valid lien on property of B worth $3,000. B owns
$5,000 of other nonexempt property but owes other creditors
$9,000. Assuming that $1,000 of $9,000 of other claims is entitled to section 64 priority, a general creditor with a $3,000 claim
will only receive $1 500. 5,ooo- 1,ooo x 3,ooo 3 000]. S's $3 000
'

9,000-1,000

'

'

claim, however, will be completely satisfied; S will receive the
value of the property subject to the lien.
The debtor rehabilitation provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act differ from straight bankruptcy in that the debtor looks to
rehabilitation and reorganization, rather than liquidation, and
the creditors look to future earnings of the bankrupt, rather
than property held by the 1bankrupt at the time of the institution of the bankruptcy proceeding to satisfy their claims. There
9. "The ultimate test of the protection afforded a secured creditor is: will it hold
up against the trustee in bankruptcy." J. MURRAY & T. WHITE, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS PROBLEM TEACHING MATERIALS 179 (1973).
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are several different types of debtor relief cases, each governed
by separate and distinct chapters of the Bankruptcy Act: reorganization of railroads under section 77; municipal debt composition under Chapter IX; corporate reorganizations under
Chapter X; business arrangements under Chapter XII; and
wage earner plans under Chapter XIII. In the rehabilitation
proceedings as in straight bankruptcy, the rights and remedies
of a creditor with a valid lien are substantially greater than
those of an unsecured creditor. 10
As the preceding paragraphs imply, some liens that are
valid outside of bankruptcy are not valid in bankruptcy. While
invalidation of liens benefits primarily the creditors without
liens, general creditors are not permitted to challenge the validity ofliens themselves. The trustee in bankruptcy, however, as
representative of the creditors is given a variety of powers to
avoid or supersede prebankruptcy "transfers," as defined in
section 1(30), that give rise to liens.
This does not mean that the trustee will be able to avoid
every lien so that in bankruptcy all creditors will be general
creditors and thus be treated equally. Perhaps the Act could
have so provided; perhaps the Act should have so provided.
But, it did not. Instead it provides the trustee with certain
powers under sections 60, 67a, 67c, 67d, 70c and 70e to attack
the liens of creditors. Recordation plays an important part in
at least three 9f these provisions:/ sections 70c, 60, and 67d. 11

A.

Section 70c

Sectioh 70c provides in pertinent part: "the trustee shall
have as of the date of bankruptcy the rights and powers of: . . .
a creditor who upon the date of bankruptcy obtained a lien by
legal or equitable proceedings upon all property . . . whether
10. See generally F.Kennedy, Secured Creditors: The Impact of Bankruptcy on
Their Interests, in ICLE, BASIC BANKRUPTCY ALTERNATIVES, PROCEEDINGS AND
DISCHARGES 155, 172-183 (1971).
11. It would seem that recordation also plays an important part in lien invalidation under§ 70e. See generally D. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS 445-47 (1973);
Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases, 47 N.Y.U.L.REv. 631, 65663 (1972). Professor Kennedy strongly disagrees; see Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy as a Secured Creditor Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 M1ctt.L.REv.
1419 (1967). The Commission's Bill reflects Professor Kennedy's position, § 4-604(b).
Because of this and because present § 70c is virtually never invoked in a recordation
situation, this article will not discuss § 70e.
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or not such a creditor exists." Section 70c does not describe the
rights and powers of this hypothetical judicial lien creditor.
Rather, to determine the rights and powers of such a creditor
it is necessary to look to non-bankruptcy state law. The state
law generally "looked to" is the applicable recording statute.
Every state has statutory recording requirements for transfers
of realty and security transfers of personalty.
The following hypothetical illustrates the application of
section 70c. On January 1, 1975, B gives Ma mortgage on B's
non-exempt real property. Before M can record the mortgage,
B on February 2, 1975, files a voluntary bankruptcy. Under
applicable state law, a mortgage is not effective against judgement lien creditors until recorded. Since M had not recorded
the mortgage, as of the date of bankruptcy, a creditor who
obtained a judicial lien on the date of bankruptcy could invalidate M's mortgage. Section 70c gives the bankruptcy trustee
the status, i.e., the rights and powers, of a creditor who obtains
a judicial lien as of the date of bankruptcy. Accordingly, the
trustee could invalidate M's mortgage under 70c.
Statutory recording requirements for transfers of realty
vary greatly from state to state. The variables include (1) the
type of document to be filed, (2) place of filing, (3) geographical
extent of the filing unit, and (4) persons protec.ted by the filing
requirement. 12 For purposes of bankruptcy law, it is the final
variable that is the most significant. For the bankruptcy trustee to be able to void an unrecorded transfer of realty under
section 70c, the protection of the applicable recording statute
must extend to judicial lien creditors. For the bankruptcy trustee to be able to void an unrecorded transfer of realty under
section 70e, an actual, existing creditor must be within the
coverage of the applicable recording statute.
In approximately one third of the states, real property recording statutes expressly limit their protection to bona fide
purchasers.13 The courts in such states have uniformly excluded creditors from the protection of the act. In most other
states, the recording statutes purport to protect all third parties from unrecorded transfers of realty. In some jurisdictions
12. See generally Aigler, The Operation of the Recording Acts, 22 M1rn.L.REv. 405
(1922).
13. See generally G.OSBORNE, MORTGAGES, § 210 (2d ed. 1970)
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with such a statute, however, courts have limited "third persons" to bona fide purchasers. 14 Where the real property recording statute protects only purchasers, the trustee will not be able
to avoid an unrecorded transfer of realty under 70c. Section 70c
does not give the trustee the status of a purchaser.
Thus, the effect in bankruptcy of a failure to record a real
property mortgage will vary from state to state. In states with
real property recording statutes that protect lien creditors the
mortgage will be invalid under 70c; in states with real property
recording statutes that protect only bona fide purchasers the
mortgage will not be vulnerable to a section 70c attack.
Recording statutes governing security transfers of personalty do not present the same uniformity problem. In every state
except Louisiana security transfers of personalty are governed
by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 15 However, a
famous (or perhaps "infamous") circuit court decision has resulted in one section 70c for the Ninth Circuit and another for
the rest of the United States. The case is Pacific Finance Corp.
u. Edwards. 16 There X, on November 12, 1959, recorded a conditional sales contract executed on October 10th. Subsequently, a bankruptcy petition was filed. The applicable recording statute provided that a conditional sales contract was
void as to subsequent creditors if not recorded within ten days
of execution. Under these facts, it would seem that the trustee
in bankruptcy could invalidate X's consensual lien. The lien
would be invalid as to any subsequent creditor and under 70c
the trustee has the status of a subsequent creditor-i. e., a creditor who extended credit to the bankrupt as of the date of the
filing of the bankruptcy petition. The Ninth Circuit found otherwise: it held that the avoidance under section 70c is dependent upon the existence of an actual subsequent creditor and
that since there were no such actual creditors the trustee could
not successfully invoke section 70c.
14. See generally Note, Status of Judgment Creditors Under the Recording Acts,
32 NOTRE DAME LAW. 471 (1971).
15. Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, filing, i.e., recordation, is
the most common method of perfecting, i.e., giving public notice of the lien. It is not,
however, the only method. Some security interests are perfected by the secured party
taking possession of the collateral; some are automatically perfected. See UCC 9-302;
see generally Ruud, The Perfection of Security Interests Under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code - How? Where? When? How Often? 44 TEXAS L. R. 724 (1966).
16. 304 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1962).
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Section 70c has long provided that the trustee has the
status of a creditor with a judicial lien "whether or not such a
creditor exists." A number of commentators have focused on
this language in criticizing Pacific Finance.11 The Pacific
Finance court reconciled this language with its holding by
stressing the word "such." The opinion takes the position that
section 70c does not require the existence of an actual subsequent creditor with a judicial lien-of such a creditor-but that
it does require the existence of an actual subsequent creditor-of a creditor. In other words, the Pacific Finance view is
that the trustee under 70c cannot hypothesize the existence of
a subsequent creditor, but if, under the applicable recording
statute only subsequent lien creditors can invalidate the lien
in question and there is an actual subsequent general creditor,
the trustee can hypothesize the necessary lien.
The present status of Pacific Finance is somewhat unclear.
It remains the law in the Ninth Circuit. No other circuit has
expressly accepted or directly rejected Pacific Finance.
The state to state variations in application are not the only
troublesome aspect of present section 70c. Generally, section
70c can invalidate a lien only where there has been a failure to
record. Absent a recording statute similar to the one involved
in the Pacific Finance case - a recording statu.te that provides
that a transfer not filed within a specific time period is ineffective - section 70c cannot be used to attack delays in filing.
Reconsider the hypothetical on page 74. Assume that M
delayed in recording her mortgage until December 12, 1975. If
B did not file for bankruptcy until December 13, 1975, M's
mortgage will be valid. Does this make sense?
In the original version of the hypothetical, a delay in recordation of little more than a month resulted in invalidation of
M's mortgage; in the amended fact statement, a delay of recordation of almost a year did not affect M's rights. Shouldn't the
validity of M's mortgage turn on how long M delayed in recording rather than on whether M recorded before the bankruptcy
petition was filed? At the very least, it seems that a delay in
recordation should be a significant factor in determining the
17. E.g., King, Pacific Finance Corp. u. Edwards: Another Misreading of Section
70c of the Bankruptcy Act, 69 CoLuM. L. REv. 232 (1963).
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validity of a lien in bankruptcy. While recordation delay, as
contrasted with recordation failure, is not significant under
section 70c, it is in section 60 and section 67d.

B.

Section 60

At first glance, section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act does not
seem to have any connection with recordation requirements.
Professor Charles Seligson, the leading expert on bankruptcy
law, explained the rationale of section 60 as follows:
"A cornerstone of the ban~ruptcy structure is the
principle that equal tr~atment for those similarly situated must be achieved. It would be highly inequitable to disregard what transpires prior to the filing of
the bankruptcy petition; to do so would encourage a
race among creditors, engender favoritism by the
debtor, and result in inequality of distribution. At
bankruptcy, the bankrupt would be left, aS' Collier
says, with only tag ends and remnants of unencumbered assets. Therefore, Congress arbitrarily prescribed the four-month period preceding the filing of
the bankruptcy petition as the period in which preferential transfers shall be prohibited. However, in order
to give some measure of security to those dealing with
the bankrupt who are unaware, actually or constructively, of the bankrupt's insolvency, Congress has
provided that preferential transfers may not be
avoided unless the creditor receiving the preference
had reasonable cause to believe that the bankrupt
was insolvent." 18

Seligson's statement suggests that section 60 is quite different from section 70c: 70c promotes perfection of security
interests; section 60 promotes equality of distribution. However, a closer examination of section 60, particularly 60a(2},
reveals a considerable overlap between the purposes and particulars of sections 60 and 70c-reveals that recordation affects
the trustee's avoidance powers under section 60 as well as
under section 70c.
There are eight elements of a section 60 preferenceelements easily discernible from reading section 60a(l):
18. Seligson, The Code and the Bankruptcy Act, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 292 (1967).
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(1) a transfer [broadly defined in section 1(30) to include
both absolute transfers and security transfers];
(2)

of the bankrupt's non-exempt property;

(3)

made or suffered by the bankrupt;

(4)

within four months of the filing of a bankruptcy peti-

(5)

to or for the benefit of a creditor;

(6)

for or on account of an antecedent debt;

(7)

while the debtor was insolvent;

tion;

(8) the effect of which must be to enable the transferee
to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other
creditors of the same class.
The first, second, third and fifth requirements of section
60a(l) seem easy to apply. The eighth element of a preference
under 60a(l) presents the most difficulty in understanding and
application. It requires determination of (1) what is a "class"
of creditors; (2) whether other creditors are in the same class
as the transferee; and (3) whether the transfer enables the
transferee to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than these
other creditors. For purposes of this article, it is assumed that
the eighth element is satisfied by any transfer of security except a transfer of security to a creditor who is already completely secured. 19
19. The most commonly cited judicial discussion of the concept of class in § 60 is
that appearing in Swarts v. Fourth Nat'! Bank, 117 F. 1, 6-7 (8th Cir. 1902). The court
stated that:
"While, it is true that the bankrupt act does not define the word
'class,' nor in terms state what creditors are in the same class, it
creates some classes and specifies others, and it seems to us that
the meaning of the word 'class' in the act should, if possible, be
derived from the statute itself. Section 64 . . . creates . . . classes
of creditors . . . entitled to priority. Sections 56b, 57e and 57h
provide for the treatment and disposition of claims secured by
property and of claims which have priority. The creditors who hold
these various claims and the general creditors of the estate constitute the classes of creditors of which the bankrupt act treats. Now
if any one of these various classes is taken by itself and examined,
it will be seen that each one of the creditors in the same class
always receives the same percentage upon his claim, out of the
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The following hypothetical illustrates the application of
these eight elements of section 60a(l) in a lien invalidation
context. On January 1, 1975, D borrows $1,000 from S. S does
not then obtain any security for her loan. On May 5, 1975, S
learns that D is in financial difficulty and demands payment
or assurance of payment. Accordingly, D gives S a lien on
machinery. On June 6, 1975, D files a voluntary bankruptcy
petition. The May 5, 1975, transfer of a lien by D to S would
be a section 60 preference. There was (1) a transfer (2) of the
bankrupt's non-exempt property (3) by the bankrupt (4) within
4 months of bankruptcy (5) to a creditor (6) for an antecedent
debt (7) while the debtor was insolvent (8) which preferred the
transferee over others in the transferee's class. Section 60b provides that the trustee can invalidate a preference if the transferee has "at the time when the transfer is made, reasonable
cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent."
In applying the fourth, sixth and seventh requirements of
section 60a(l) and 60b, it is necessary to know the date of the
transfer in question. The date of the transfer is not always easy
to determine. Section 60a(2) provides that a transfer shall be
deemed to have been made or suffered only when perfected as
against certain specified other parties. If the transfer is of
realty, the relevant "other parties" are subsequent bona fide
purchasers; if the transfer is one of personalty, the "other parties" are subsequent judicial lien creditors.
Certain transfers are perfected against "other parties" as
soon as made. Cash payments to a creditor or actual deliveries
of tangible personal property are deemed to have been made
when they were actually made because they are then perfected
as against subsequent liens obtained by judicial proceedings.
Other transfers such as real property conveyances, mortgages,
and security transfers of personal property are ordinarily not
perfected as against "other parties" until some further step
such as filing or recording has been taken. In other words, state
estate of the bankrupt, that every other creditor of his class receives. . . . The test of classification is the percentage paid upon
the claims out of the estate of the bankrupt."
See generally Note, Class-The Forgotten Element of Section 60a (1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 Amz. L. REV. 362 (1969). In this focus, it would seem that a transfer of
a lien to an unsecured creditor will have a preferential effect unless the bankruptcy
estate is sufficiently large as to permit 100% payments to all creditors.
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recording statutes determine when lien transfers are deemed
made. Thus, recordation is an important part of section 60 lien
invalidatiom.
The following hypothetical points up the importance of
recordation in section 60 contests. B, a Texas debtor, borrows
$100,000 from S, an Arkansas lender, on February 7, 1975, giving S a security interest in equipment in Texas. S does not
perfect this security interest until March 6, 1975. B files a
voluntary bankruptcy petition on July 1, 1975. At first, it might
seem that section 60 is not applicable-that the security transfer from B to S was not for an antecedent indebtedness and did
not occur within four months of the bankruptcy. For purposes
of section 60, however, the transfer will be deemed made on
March 6, 1975, not February 7, 1975. Under Section 9-301(1)(b)
of the Uniform Commercial Code, S's security interest would
not be perfected as against subsequent judicial lien creditors
until that date. Accordingly, by reason of section 60a(2), the
transfer will not be deemed made until that date. Thus, the
transfer would be within four months of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Thus, the transfer would be for an antecedent
indebtedness, i.e., the $100,000 loaned on February 7, 1975,
almost a month prior to the time that the transfer was deemed
made.
The above hypothetical illustrates the section 60 significance of timely perfection of liens. A delay in perfection can
result in a transfer actually made for present consideration
being deemed made for an antecedent indebtedness and thus
a section 60 preference. From the language of 60a(2), it would
seem that any delay in perfection-regardless of how slightcould have this effect. Section 60a(7), however, tempers
section 60a(2).
Section 60a(7) is essentially a grace period provision. It
provides that a transfer is regarded as having occurred on the
actual date of the transfer if the transferee perfects it in the
manner required by state law (1) within twenty-one days or (2)
sooner, if the state law requires. The grace period afforded by
section 60a(7) to transfers in fact made for new consideration
is twenty-one days, unless state law provides a shorter grace
period; the twenty-one day period is the maximum allowable
even if the state law allows more.
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Section 60a(7) is applicable only if the transfer of security
is in fact made "on account of a new and contemporaneous
consideration." In other words, the lien must be given at the
time that the debt is incurred. To illustrate, section 60a(7)
would be applicable to a security interest given on February 7,
1975, to secure a debt incurred on February 7, 1975. It would,
however, not be applicable if the February 7, 1975, transfer of
a security interest was to secure a debt incurred prior to
February 7, 197 4.
In summary, the date of recordation can be an important
factor in determining whether a lien is invalid as a section 60
preference. Two different types of transfers of liens would seem
to be section 60 preferences: (1) a lien actually given for an
antecedent debt and (2) a lien actually given for new consideration that is not timely recorded.
C.

Section 67d

Section 67d, like section 60, does not appear to have any
connection with recordation. Section 67d is a fraudulent conveyance provision. It is very similar to the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyances Act (hereafter referred to as the UFCA). 20
Section 67d(l) is a definitional provision and corresponds
to sections 1, 2 and 3 of the UFCA. Section 67d(2) telescopes
into one exceedingly long and complex sentence sections 4
through 7 of the UFCA; if the debtor within one year of bankruptcy made a transfer without fair consideration while insolvent, or if he is rendered insolvent thereby, or if the transfer is
made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud existing or future
creditors, or is made without fair consideration while the
debtor is engaged in business and is left thereby without reasonable capital to conduct the business, without regard to intent, or is made without fair consideration by a debtor who
expects to incur obligations beyond his ability to pay as they
mature, such transfer is fraudulent. Section 67d(4) is similar
to the partnership provisions of section 8 of the UFCA. Section
67d(5) affords bona fide purchasers the same protection as
UFCA section 9.
20. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, adopted in twenty-three states, is
set out volume 7 of the Uniform Laws Annotated.
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While fraudulent conveyances are generally absolute
transfers, the creation of a lien can be a fraudulent
conveyance. 21 For example D, unable to pay his debts and concerned that his creditors will institute legal proceedings to seize
his property, gives, F, his father a mortgage on all of his property. Shortly thereafter, the creditors of D file an involuntary
bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy trustee would be able to
invalidate the transfer of the mortgage from D to Fas a fraudulent conveyance. When D made the transfer, D was insolvent
and did not receive fair consideration. When D made the transfer, D intended to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors.
The time of transfer is of course important in section 67d.
The solvency of the debtor is measured as of the time of the
transfer. The transfer must have occurred within 1 year of the
filing of the bankruptcy petition. 22 In section 67d, as in section
60, the important time is not the date that the transfer actually
occurred but rather the date that the transfer is deemed to have
occurred.
Section 67d(5) fixes the time that a transfer is deemed
made: when the transfer has been so far perfected that no bona
fide purchaser from the debtor can thereafter acquire any
rights superior to those of the transferee in the property. Section 67d(5) also provides that if the transfer is not perfected
before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, it will be deemed
to have been made just before the bankruptcy petition.
The time of perfection as against a bona fide purchaser is
important not only for limitation purposes but also as the time
for determining whether the transfer was fraudulent under either 67d(2), (3), or (4). If, for example, the trustee is contending
that a transfer was fraudulent under either 67d(2) (a) or 67d(4)
which requires proof of insolvency of the transferor, the trustee
can satisfy the insolvency requirement by showing insolvency
of the transferor debtor at the time the transfer became valid
as against a bona fide purchaser. Thus, again, a lien can be
invalidated by the bankruptcy trustee because of recordation.
21. See, e.g., Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 13 Ariz. App. 431, 477
P.2d 550 (1970); In re Rasmussen's Estate, 238 Wis. 334, 298 N.W. 172 (1941).
22. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2).
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Kindom Uranium Corp. v. Vance, 23 is the classic illustration of the application of section 67d(5). There the debtor made
a gift of real estate to her brother. At the time of the gift, the
debtor had no financial problems. The debtor, however, subsequently became involved in an automobile accident which resulted in litigation against her. During the litigation, debtor's
brother finally recorded the deed pursuant to state law. Thereafter, the person injured by debtor recovered a $15,000 judgment which debtor was unable to pay. The debtor filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition. Thereafter, the bankruptcy trustee
invalidated the gift of real estate to her brother under section
67d.

Note that the recordation or rather the delay in recordation was crucial to the bankruptcy trustee's section 67d case.
At the time that the gift was actually made, the debtor was
solvent. There are no legal problems with people who are solvent making gifts. It happens every Christmas and Chanukah.
Gifts are fraudulent conveyances only when made by insolvents.
While the debtor in Kindom was solvent when the gift was
actually made, she was not solvent when the gift was "deemed"
made. Since the transfer was not by state law perfected against
bona fide purchasers until recordation, the trustee was allowed
to invoke section 67d although the actual transfer occurred
almost two years before bankruptcy. And, since the transfer
was deemed made during the lawsuit, it was held fraudulent
under section 67d(2)(c) as one made without fair consideration
"by a debtor who intends to incur or believes that he will incur
debts beyond his ability to pay as they mature. In so holding,
the court stated:
"Since the time of the transfer was [deemed to be]
during the trial of a claim against her, large in
amount as tested by her income, and since she was
already indebted to her brother [for $900) and
[was] responsible for supporting herself and her
daughter, the deduction is inescapable that at that
time she contemplated incurring liabilities which she
could not discharge as they matured." 2'
23. 269 F.2d 104 (10th Cir. 1959).
24. 269 F.2d at 107.

84

SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

Section 67d can thus be summarized in much the same
way as section 60 was. Two separate and distinct kinds of
transfers are affected by section 67d: (1) true fraudulent conveyances, e.g., gifts by insolvents, transfers made with an intent to defraud creditors and (2) "technical" fraudulent conveyances, i.e., transfers "valid" when actually "made" that are
not timely recorded.

II.

COMMISSION'S BILL AND JUDGES' BILL

Both the Commission's Bill and the Judges' Bill represent
a substantial departure from present bankruptcy law and practice. 25 While the most drastic changes are in the general areas
of bankruptcy administration, consumer relief and business
rehabilitation, changes have been proposed in the various lien
invalidation provisions. These changes do not, however, change
the basic role of recordation in bankruptcy lien invalidation.

A.

Section 4-604(a)

Section 4-604(a) of both the Commission's Bill and the
Judges' Bill correspond to section 70c of the present Bankruptcy Act. The two versions of section 4-604(a) are virtually
identical to each other. The two versions of section 4-604(a) are
virtually identical to section 70c.
The trustee has the "rights and powers of a judicial lien
creditor" as of the date of bankruptcy. Such rights and powers
are determined by state law, primarily state recording statutes.
If such statutes protect lien creditors, the bankruptcy trustee
will be able to invalidate liens that are not recorded as of the
date of bankruptcy. However, even if such statutes do protect
lien creditors, the bankruptcy trustee will generally not be able
to invalidate liens recorded prior to bankruptcy, but after a
considerable delay.

B.

Section 4-607

Section 4-607 in both bills is designed to replace section
25. There have already been several Jaw review articles that survey the two bills.
See e.g., Lee, A Critical Comparison of the Commission Bill and the Judges' Bill for
the Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 49 AM.BANKR.L.J.1 (1975); Walker, An Introduction to the Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973: From Revision to Revolution, 41
TENN.L.REv. 635 (1975).
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60 of the Bankruptcy Act. Both proposals substantially
change the present law of preferences. Both bills define a
preference as a transfer made while the debtor was insolvent
to pay or secure an antecedent debt. The Commission's Bill
shortens the four month period of the present Act to three
months for preferences to creditors other than "insiders." 26
The Judges' Bill retains the traditional four month period. 27
Under both bills, preferential transfers to "insiders" - e.g., a
member of the debtor's immediate family, officer, director,
partner, or managing agent of the debtor - within one year
of the filing of the petition can be avoided. 28
The most difficult problems of proof under the present
version of section 60 are (1) insolvency at the time of transfer
and (2) reasonable cause by the transferee to believe that the
debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer. 29 Both bills
ameliorate these problems of proof. Under both bills, insolvency of the debtor is presumed for the initial preference period
(i.e., three months under the Commission's Bill, four months
under the Judges' Bill). 30 Similarly for this period, both bills
eliminate the requirement of proof of reasonable cause to believe. 31 The Judges' Bill also shifts the burden on insolvency
and eliminates reasonable cause to believe as to preferential
transfers to insiders during the earliest eight (8) months one
year prior to bankruptcy; 32 the Commission's Bill does not.
These proposed changes in proof of insolvency and "reasonable cause to believe" will make it much easier for bankruptcy trustees to invalidate transfers as preferences. Although
the above-discussed changes do not mention recordation, they
indirectly affect the role of recordation in bankruptcy lien invalidation. They increase the likelihood that a delay in recordation will result in a lien being invalidated as a preferential
transfer.
26. § 4-607(a)(l) (Commission)
27. § 4-607(a)(l)(Judges)
28. § 4-607(a)(2)
29. Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, Part
I 204 (July 1973).
30. § 4-607(f)(Commission); § 4-607(g)(Judges)
31. § 4-607(a)(l); see generally Note, Voidable Preferences: An Analysis of the
Proposed Revisions of Section 60b of the Bankruptcy Act, 1974 Wisc. L.REv. 481.
32. § 4-607(a)(2)(Judges)
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For example, on January 1, 1975, X borrows $1,000 from
Y and gives Ya mortgage on Green Acre. On February 2, 1975,
Y records the mortgage in the manner prescribed by state law.
On March 3, 1975, X files a voluntary bankruptcy petition.
Under section 60, the trustee will have to establish (1) X was
insolvent on February 2, 1975, and (2) Y had reasonable cause
to believe that X was insolvent on February 2, 1975. Under
section 4-607 of the Commission's Bill or the Judges' Bill, the
trustee will not have to prove either. 33
There are some provisions in both bills that more directly
speak to recordation.
"A transfer of real property other than fixtures,
but including the interest of a seller or purchaser
under a contract for the sale of real property, is perfected when the transferee has acquired an interest in
the property which is superior to the rights a subsequent bona fide purchaser of the property from the
transferor could subsequently acquire by his purchase. A transfer of fixtures or of property other than
real property is perfected when the transferee has
acquired an interest in the property which is superior
to the rights a subsequent judicial lien creditor could
acquire in the property transferred.
"A transfer occurs when it takes effect between
the parties if perfected at that time or within ten days
thereafter. If perfected after the ten days, the transfer
occurs when perfection occurs. Unless perfected
within ten days, a transfer not perfected before the
filing of the petition dates from a time immediately
preceding such filing. A transfer does not take effect
before the transferor has acquired rights in the property. " 3 ~

The first quoted paragraph corresponds to section 60a(2)
of the present act: using the bona fide purchaser standard for
transfers of real property and the judicial lien creditor test for
transfers of personalty. The second paragraph set out above
replaces section 60a(7). It substitutes a fixed ten-day grace
period for the twenty-one day maximum grace period of section
60a(7).
33. To be precise, the trustee will have to establish insolvency but there is a
statutory presumption of insolvency.
34. § 4-607(g)(6)&(7)(Commission); § 4-607(i)(Judges)
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Again, the effect of the proposals can best be understood
by illustration. On January 1, 1975, D borrows $1,000 from S
and gives Sa security interest on her car. 35 S neglects to record
its security interest until January 20, 1975. Under section
60(a)(7)'s 21-day grace period, the transfer of the security interest will be deemed to have occurred on January 1, 1975. No
antecedent debt. No preference.
Under section 4-607's 10-day grace period, the transfer of
the security interest will be deemed to have occurred on January 20, 1975. The Commission's Bill defines "antecedent debt"
as "a debt incurred more than five days before a transfer paying or securing a debt." 36 Accordingly, applying the Commission version of section 4-607 to the hypothetical, there would
be "antecedent debt" and the 19-day delay in recordation
would result in invalidation of the security interest as a
preference. The Judges' Bill defines "antecedent debt" as "a
debt incurred more than thirty days before a transfer paying
or securing a debt." 37 Applying the Judges' section 4-607 to the
hypothetical, no antecedent debt and thus no preference.
In this focus, the proposed bills do not change the role of
recordation in invalidation of liens as preferences. All that is
to be changed is the time period that a creditor can delay
recordatiori without risking lien invalidation. 38

C.

Section 4-608 of the Commission's Bill and Section 4-609
of the Judges' Bill

Section 4-608 of the Commission's Bill and section 4-609
of the Judges' Bill are the primary fraudulent conveyance provisions in the proposed acts. Notwithstanding the difference in
numbering, the two are basically similar to each other. 39 The
35. In most states, recordation of a lien on an automobile is accomplished by
notation of the lien on the certificate of title. See UCC 9-302(3); see generally Murphey,
Cars, Creditors and the Code, 1970 WASH.U.L.Q. 135.
36. § 4-607(g)(l)(Commission)
37. § 4-607(h)(l)(Judges)
38. Reading § 4-607(i) together with § 4-607(h)(l), it seems that the Judges' Bill
is providing for what amounts to a 30-day grace period. If there is a 29-day delay in
recordation, the transfer will be deemed to have occurred on the date of recordation
rather than the date of the actual transfer. Nevertheless, the trustee would not be able
to invalidate the transfer because of the 30-day gap permitted by the definition of
antecedent debt.
39. See generally Countryman, Some Good and Some Bad Features of the Proposed New Bankruptcy Act, UCC L.J. 213, 228-29 (1975).
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two proposals are also basically similar to section 67 d of the
existing Act. While there are differences between the two provisions and present law, the role of recordation remains the same.
"A transfer occurs at the time when it becomes
so far perfected that no bona fide purchaser from the
debtor other than a buyer in the ordinary course of
business could thereafter have acquired any rights in
the property transferred superior to the rights of the
transferee therein, but if the transfer is not so perfected prior to the date of the petition under this title,
it occurs immediately before the date of the petition."

Accordingly, under the proposed legislation as under the
present law, a transfer that is not a fraudulent conveyance,
viewed as of the date it is actually made, can be invalidated
as a fraudulent conveyance because of a delay in recordation
and a change in the debtor's financial situation.
Ill.

AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL

Under both the present bankruptcy act and the two proposals that Congress is currently considering, recordation is a
factor in lien invalidation. Under both the present bankruptcy
act and the two proposals, the failure to record will result in
loss of lien status if the applicable recording statute protects
lien creditors. That is the effect of section 70c and proposed
section 4-604. The result is less clear if the applicable recording
statute only protects bona fide purchasers. Invalidation then
hinges on the trustee's satisfying the various requirements of
the preference or fraudulent conveyance provision. Similarly,
invalidation of a lien because of a delay in recordation turns on
proof of a preference or a fraudulent conveyance.
It is submitted that a failure to record or a delay in recording should be a factor in determining the validity of a lien.
Such inaction on the part of a lien creditor can prejudice other
creditors. If creditor X does not record its lien, creditor Y might
not know that the debtor's property is encumbered; relying on
the mistaken belief that the debtor holds his or her property
free from liens, Y might extend credit or refrain from obtaining
a lien or instituting collection proceedings.
Just as there is a bankruptcy policy against preferences
and fraudulent conveyances there should be a bankruptcy pol-
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icy against recordation delays and failures. And, this policy
should be manifested in the same fashion as the policy against
preferences and fraudulent conveyances: a separate section of
the Bankruptcy Act setting specific recordation standards.
Instead of the present and proposed piecemeal treatment of
recordation problems, the Bankruptcy Act should simply provide that consensual liens that are not recorded or otherwise
perfected within ten days 40 of their creation shall be invalid in
bankruptcy. 41
The following chart shows the impact of this proposal.
40. There is nothing "magical" about ten days. This number was selected because
it was used by the Commission in § 4-607(h)(2) and because it appears throughout the
time requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code. See, e.g., 2-702(2); 9-301(2).
41. Others earlier recognized the problems presented by the piecemeal treatment
of recordation in the present Bankruptcy Act. For example, in 1970, Professor Robert
Morris of the University of Minnesota called for changing the law of preferences so that
delay in recordation would not result in technical preferences. See Morris, Bankruptcy
Law Reform: Preferences, Secret Liens and Floating Liens, 54 MINN.L.REv. 737 (1970).
See also § 4-608 (Commission), note 9.
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